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Abstract While the rights of domestic workers are expanding in international
law, including through the adoption of the ILO Domestic Workers
Convention in 2011, migrant domestic workers remain particularly vulnerable
to employment-related abuse and exploitation. This article explores the
intersection of the employment law and migration law regimes applicable to
migrant domestic workers in the United Kingdom, France and Ireland. The
article suggests that the precarious immigration status of many migrant
domestic workers renders employment protections, such as they exist in each
jurisdiction, largely illusory in practice for this group of workers. The labour
standards contained in the Domestic Workers Convention, together with the
recommendations of the UN Committee on Migrant Workers on the features
of an appropriate immigration regime for migrant domestic workers, are
identified as providing an alternative normative model for national regulatory
frameworks.
Keywords: Article 4 ECHR, employment law, ILO Convention, immigration law,
migrant domestic workers.
I. INTRODUCTION: MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN EUROPE
Recent decades have witnessed the resurgence of paid domestic work in
Europe, in parallel with the increase in female participation in the labour
force.1 Many of the ‘new’ domestic workers are migrant women, often
employed by middle-class women who may prefer to outsource the ‘three C’s’
(cooking, cleaning and caring)2 to women ‘different from themselves’.3
Migrant domestic workers are recognized as being particularly susceptible
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1 G Ozyegin and P Hondagneu-Sotelo, ‘Domestic Work, Migration and the New Gender
Order in Contemporary Europe’, in H Lutz (ed) Migration and Domestic Work: A European
Perspective on a Global Theme (Ashgate 2008) 195.
2 B Anderson, Doing the Dirty Work? The Global Politics of Domestic Labour (Zed Books
2000).
3 Ozyegin and Hondagneu-Sotelo (n 1) 199; B Anderson, ‘A Very Private Business:
Exploring the Demand for Migrant Domestic Workers’ (2007) 14(3) European Journal of
Women’s Studies 247.
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to abuse and exploitation, with this vulnerability attributable to a number of
factors including the isolated and invisible nature of their work,4 their level
of dependence on their employer (for income, accommodation and immigra-
tion status),5 a lack of clear legal regulation of the specific occupational
challenges which they face,6 and often a restrictive immigration status.7
A common thread running through these concerns is the power imbalance
between employer and employee in the domestic-work scenario, which may be
exacerbated by restrictions on employment and access to social security
associated with the immigration status of the worker.8 As Anderson observes,
immigration law moulds migrant domestic workers (like other low-waged
migrant workers) into ‘precarious workers’, their situation characterized by
instability, lack of protection, insecurity and social or economic vulnerability.9
All of these factors are further compounded by multiple, intersecting forms
of discrimination based on class, race, nationality and gender, with migrant
domestic workers caught ‘at the intersection of care work exploitation
with gender, ethnic and migrant oppression in the context of a globalising
world’.10
Migrant domestic workers frequently suffer from a ‘decent work deficit’11 as
well as restricted access to family reunification and limited access to education,
health care and housing.12 Specific manifestations of the decent work deficit
include low wages and non-payment of wages, excessive and undefined work
hours, insufficient rest and leisure time, a lack of social security protection and
exposure to psychological and physical abuse.13 These problems are largely
4 See, for example, MA Chen ‘Recognizing Domestic Workers, Regulating Domestic Work:
Conceptual, Measurement, and Regulatory Challenges’ (2011) 23 Canadian Journal of Women and
the Law 167; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Rights of Migrant
Domestic Workers in Europe’ (2010) 7.
5 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (n 4) 4.
6 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (n 4) 6; Chen (n 4) 169–70.
7 A Blackett, ‘Introduction: Regulating Decent Work for Domestic Workers’ (2011) 23
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1.
8 See, for example, B Anderson, ‘Migration, Immigration Controls and the Fashioning of
Precarious Workers’ (2010) 24(2) Work, Employment & Society 300.
9 ibid 303.
10 F Williams, ‘Migration and Care: Themes, Concepts and Challenges’ (2010) 9(3) Social
Policy and Society 385.
11 M Tomei, ‘Decent Work for Domestic Workers: Reflections on Recent Approaches to
Tackle Informality’ (2011) 23 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 186, 187. See also A
D’Souza, ‘Moving towards Decent Work for Domestic Workers: An Overview of the ILO’s Work’
(2010) ILO Working Paper 2/2010, 19.
12 See EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) Report, ‘Migrants in an Irregular Situation
Employed in Domestic Work: Fundamental Rights Challenges for the European Union and its
Member States’ (2011). For regular migrants, this is the case where recourse to ‘public funds’ is
prohibited by the terms of their visa. In the UK context, see generally J Pobjoy and S Spencer,
‘Equality for All? The Relationship between Immigration Status and the Allocation of Rights in the
United Kingdom’ (2012) 2 European Human Rights Law Review 160.
13 Committee on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families, General Comment No 1 on Migrant Domestic Workers (UN Doc CMW/C/GC/1,
23 February 2011) (CMW General Comment) para 13.
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unseen for the rest of society, with the classic gendered divide between the
public and the private spheres partly explaining the lack of public attention
given to exploitation of domestic workers.14
Developments in international law have begun to recognize the
specific rights-protection gaps experienced by domestic workers, and in
particular migrant domestic workers. The adoption of the International Labour
Organization’s (ILO) Domestic Workers Convention (Domestic Workers
Convention) and Supplementary Recommendation,15 along with a General
Comment of the UN Committee on Migrant Workers and their Families16
on migrant domestic workers and a General Recommendation of the UN
Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW Committee) on women migrant workers17 constitute an acknowl-
edgement of the need for specific human rights protections for domestic
workers. At a regional level, the European Court of Human Rights has
established and developed the positive obligations of states to protect
individuals from slavery, servitude and forced labour (as prohibited under
Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights) in Siliadin v
France,18 C.N. and V v France19 and C.N. v United Kingdom20—all cases
taken by migrant domestic workers.
Against this background, this article considers two dimensions of the role of
the State in ‘creating and perpetuating’ the principal structural disadvantages
faced by migrant domestic workers: working in a precarious employment
sector and being subject to restrictive migration controls.21 It addresses the
intersection of employment law and migration regimes through a three-country
study of France, the UK and Ireland. As will be seen in the course of the
article, the detailed legal framework for the regulation of the domestic work
sector in France, the recent launch of an innovative inspection scheme of
private homes aimed at improving enforcement of employment protections in
Ireland, and recent legislative changes to the immigration regime for domestic
workers in the UK are among the reasons why these jurisdictions have been
selected.
The analysis shows that while the approaches of the three jurisdictions
in respect of the labour regulatory framework for domestic work differ
14 H Lutz, ‘Gender in the Migratory Process’ (2010) 36(10) Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 1647, 1652.
15 Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, International Labour
Organisation, adopted at the 100th session of the International Labour Conference, Geneva, 2011.
16 CMW General Comment (n 13).
17 Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No 26 on Women Migrant Workers (UN Doc CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R,
5 December 2008) (CEDAW General Recommendation).
18 (2006) 43 EHRR 16.
19 Application No 67724/09, Judgment of 11 October 2012.
20 Application No 4239/08, Judgment of 13 November 2012.
21 Blackett (n 7) 4.
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considerably, the trend in each of the national immigration regimes is towards
restricting access to the labour market and a secure legal status for
migrant domestic workers. This convergence reflects a Europe-wide
trend for encouraging ‘highly skilled workers’ over other types of worker,
together with the perception of domestic work as unskilled and lacking
in economic value. It is argued that the short-term, precarious immigration
status of many migrant domestic workers renders employment protections,
such as they exist in each jurisdiction, largely illusory in practice for
this group of workers. It will be seen that in France and Ireland (although
not in the UK), governments have started to acknowledge the impact of
their employment laws on domestic workers and there are elements of good
practice contained in the employment frameworks applicable in those
jurisdictions. There is, however, no corresponding acknowledgement in
any of the three jurisdictions under consideration, of the nexus between
immigration policies and the vulnerability of migrant domestic workers.
Illustrating this point, the relatively progressive immigration regime enshrined
in UK law for migrant domestic workers between 1998 and 2012 (which
allowed workers to change employer, apply to have dependants join them
in the UK and eventually apply for long-term residence) has been rolled back
and replaced by a temporary and insecure visa which ties workers to their
employer.
The lack of effective protection afforded by employment law, which is
compounded by the precariousness created by immigration law, leads to
serious gaps in the protection of the human rights of migrant domestic workers.
The article thus underlines the importance of recognizing the interaction of
employment and migration regimes in assessing effective access to employ-
ment-related rights for migrant domestic workers. In this regard, it assesses the
principles and measures contained in the Domestic Workers Convention and
the UN Committee on Migrant Workers’ General Comment in order to identify
where best practice lies for these regulatory regimes. It argues that these
standards provide much-needed specific guidance for states in constructing
appropriately protective regulatory regimes.
The final part of the article evaluates the role of the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights under Article 4 of the European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in terms of addressing protection gaps
in national regulatory frameworks. While the impact of the Court’s work to
date, in requiring states to criminalize and deter forced labour is acknowledged,
it is suggested that the legal framework of Article 4 is, of itself, inadequate to
deal with labour law violations experienced by migrant domestic workers
which do not reach the threshold of severity of slavery, servitude or forced
labour. In this context, positive engagement of governments with the
international standard setting initiatives undertaken by the ILO and the UN
Committee on Migrant Workers provides the best way forward in terms of
ensuring improved rights protection for migrant domestic workers.
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II. APPROACHES TO REGULATING DOMESTIC WORK: DIVERGENCE, COMMONALITY AND
THE VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
A. Regulatory Challenges and the Normative Model Provided by the
Domestic Workers Convention
The low monetary value placed on domestic work is associated with its
location in the private sphere of the home and its status as ‘reproductive’
labour, as defined by Salazar Parrenas as ‘labour activities needed to sustain the
productive labour force’ through tasks including household chores and the care
of the elderly and children.22 This ‘reproductive labour’ is usually associated
with tasks performed by female household members without pay and
consequently perceived as unskilled and lacking in value.23 For the same
reasons, domestic work is often thought to fall outside the ‘normal’
employment regulation framework and is sometimes excluded completely
from it. The isolated nature of domestic work adds to such workers’
vulnerability and, even when regulated, enforcement of employment protec-
tions can prove difficult due to the location of the work within private
households.24 As already mentioned, the economy of domestic care is
increasingly ‘transnational’ in nature, with low-paid domestic help often
provided by migrant workers who are classified as ‘low-skilled’ workers.25
It will be seen below that the precarious immigration statuses which are
common for ‘low-skilled’ migrants make it difficult for migrant domestic
workers to pursue legal remedies against employers, rendering them
particularly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse.
Despite these difficulties, the fundamental assumption underlying the
Domestic Workers Convention is the transformative potential of a labour law
framework which recognizes the specificity of domestic work and constructs
such work, within a decent work paradigm, as a ‘proper’ job.26 The Domestic
Workers Convention is the first international instrument to address the
specificity of domestic work and the protection needs of domestic workers.
As stated in the report which preceded its negotiation, the Convention is
22 RS Parrenas, ‘Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers and the International Division of
Reproductive Labor’ (2000) 14(4) Gender and Society 560.
23 International Labour Conference, 99th Session, 2010, Decent Work for Domestic Workers
(Report IV(1)) (ILO Report on Decent Work for Domestic Workers (Report IV(1))) 5.
24 P Smith, ‘The Pitfalls of Home: Protecting the Health and Safety of Paid Domestic Workers
(2010) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 309, 311. See also P Smith, ‘Aging and Caring in
the Home: Regulating Paid Domesticity in the Twenty-First Century’ (2007) 92 Iowa Law Review
1835.
25 See generally F Williams, ‘Converging Variations in Migrant Care Work in Europe’ in
D Brennan and F Williams (eds) ‘Care Markets and Migration in a Globalising World’ (2012)
20(4) Journal of European Social Policy. See also L Benería, ‘The Crisis of Care, International
Migration and Public Policy’ (2008) 14(3) Feminist Economics 1.
26 ILO Report on Decent Work for Domestic Workers (Report IV(1)) (n 23) 13.
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intended to provide ‘specific, constructive guidance on how to effectively
regulate a category of worker that is singularly in need of support’.27
The standards contained in the Convention are wide-ranging and address
every aspect of the domestic employment relationship. States are required to
ensure that domestic workers can enjoy fair terms of employment and decent
working conditions.28 To address the information deficit often faced by
domestic workers working in isolated situations, workers must be informed
of their terms and conditions of employment in an easily understandable
manner.29 Domestic workers should enjoy equality with other workers
regarding working time.30 Express entitlements to the minimum wage,31
healthy and safe working conditions,32 and equal treatment with other workers
in respect of social security protection (including maternity)33 are included in
the Convention.34 The Convention also requires states to introduce measures
providing for effective and accessible dispute resolution mechanisms for
domestic workers.35 Pursuant to Article 5, states must provide ‘effective
protection’ against abuse, harassment and violence.
The specific category of migrant domestic workers is addressed in Article 8
of the Convention, which requires that migrant domestic workers receive a
written job offer or a contract of employment prior to crossing the national
borders. Article 8(3) also provides that ILO Members shall take measures to
cooperate with each other to ensure the effective application of the provisions
of the Convention to migrant domestic workers. The need to effectively
protect migrant domestic workers against abusive practices is referred to in
Article 15, which deals with the regulation of private employment agencies.
Notwithstanding these important references, the Convention inevitably deals
with migrant domestic workers as ‘workers’ rather than as migrants. This
means that the key issues of the lack of opportunities for legal migration as a
domestic worker in many states and the appropriate immigration status to be
granted to such workers are not dealt with.
Notwithstanding the limited nature of the specific references to migrants, the
Convention provides a basic set of standards for a model regulatory framework
to deal with the employment-related issues faced by migrant domestic workers.
As the ILO has stated, it ‘can play an important role in the design of labour law
for domestic workers’.36 It provides authoritative guidance on law and policy
regarding domestic workers and, where ratified, it entails international law
obligations for the countries concerned.37 Other international bodies have
27 ibid 2. 28 Art 6. 29 Art 7
30 Art 10. 31 Art 11.
32 Art 13. 33 Art 14.
34 In respect of health and safety regulations and social security, the Convention acknowledges
the concerns of States in these areas by allowing them to apply these measures progressively, and in
consultation with the relevant stakeholders. 35 Art 16.
36 ILO, ‘Effective Protection for Domestic Workers: A Guide to Designing Labour Laws’
(2012) 4. 37 ibid.
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confirmed and reinforced the efforts of the ILO in the area of domestic work.
The UN Committee for Migrant Workers, for example, confirms that the rights
of migrant domestic workers ‘should be dealt with within the larger framework
of decent work for domestic workers’.38 Both this Committee and the
CEDAW Committee have, in their respective General Comment and General
Recommendation, exhorted states to properly regulate domestic work by
national legislation to ensure that domestic workers enjoy the same level of
protection as other workers.39
The next section asks how states are dealing with the tensions and
‘regulatory challenges’40 involved in developing standards for the protection of
domestic workers by considering how domestic work is reflected in the
employment law frameworks of the UK, France and Ireland. None of these
states have yet ratified the Domestic Workers Convention and each displayed
varying attitudes during the process of its negotiation and adoption. Despite
taking part in the negotiation of the Convention,41 the UK was one of only
eight ILO member states to abstain from the final vote, stating that it would not
be able to ratify the Convention as it did not fit with the existing UK framework
which differentiates between domestic workers and other workers in a number
of areas.42 While Ireland voted to adopt the Convention, it was disengaged
from the negotiation and drafting process.43 Ratification is apparently under
consideration by the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs.44 In contrast, France
was actively involved in responding to the questionnaire and in the debates on
the Convention.45 French government representatives demonstrated a will-
ingness to acknowledge the importance of ensuring decent working and living
conditions for domestic workers.46 Nonetheless, the Convention has not yet
38 CMW General Comment (n 13) para 37.
39 ibid para 37-4; CEDAW General Recommendation (n 17) para 26(b).
40 Chen (n 4).
41 See ‘Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers’, International Labour Conference,
Provisional Record, 100th session, Geneva, June 2011.
42 HL Deb Col WA242 (Baroness Wilcox) (12 October 2011). See also HC Deb cols 288–9
(Ed Davey MP) (29 June 2011).
43 Prior to drafting the convention, the ILO circulated a questionnaire to members to which the
Irish State did not respond. Similarly, during the drafting negotiations the Irish government did not
make a significant contribution. In the Committee on Domestic Workers the only (recorded)
interventions of the Irish government related to the requirement to provide MDWs with a contract
of employment prior to entering the state of employment and how that would fit with EU/EEA
rights relating to free movement of workers. ILO Provisional Record, 100th Session 15 June 2011,
Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers.
44 See Written Answers, 6 March 2011, Dáil Eireann Debate Vol. 758, No 1, Richard Bruton
TD (in response to question from Mary Lou McDonald TD). See also Written Answers, Tuesday
22 May 2012, Dáil Eireann Debate Vol. 766, No 1, Richard Bruton TD (in response to question
from Gerard Nash TD).
45 See International Labour Conference, 99th session 2010, Report on Decent Work for
Domestic Workers (Report IV(2)) and ILO Provisional Record, 100th Session 15 June 2011,
Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers respectively.
46 ILO Report IV(2) (n 45) para 92.
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been ratified by France and it remains to be seen whether this will take place. In
January 2013, Italy became the first European country to ratify the Convention,
which now has four state parties.47 States have shown a similar reluctance to be
bound by the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families,48 and no European state is a
signatory to this Convention.
B. National Approaches to Regulating Domestic Work: A Job Like
Any Other, Like No Other?
1. ‘Specific regulation’ and job creation in France
The three jurisdictions under consideration address the issue of the regulation
of domestic work in very different ways.49 The French model deals with
domestic work in a highly legalized and formalized manner, within the
framework of the complex hierarchy of sources which comprises employment
law. The Code du Travail (Labour Code) sets out the general rules governing
employment conditions. Domestic workers are covered by these general rules
and are also specifically referred to in the Code.50 The Labour Code operates in
conjunction with national collective agreements, which set out in detail the
particulars of the relationship between the employer and the employee.51 The
collective agreement relating to the employees of a private employer,52 which
47 ILO, ‘Italy Ratifies the Domestic Workers Convention’ (22 January 2013). In accordance
with art 21, the Domestic Workers Convention will enter into force on 5 September 2013,
12 months after the date on which it was ratified by two ILO member States.
48 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, GA res 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No 49A) 262, UN Doc
A/45/49 (1990) entered into force on 1 July 2003.
49 This reflects the general diversity of the regulation of domestic work. See JM Ramirez-
Machado, ‘Domestic Work, Conditions of Work and Employment: A Legal Perspective’
(Conditions of Work and Employment Series No 7, ILO 2003) (ILO Conditions of Work Report) 7.
50 Issues relating to the regulation of the industry arising from ‘services a la personne’ are dealt
with in a number of articles: see Labour Code, Partie Législative Nouvelle, Septieme Partie, Livre
II, Titre III ‘Services à la Personne’ (arts 7231, 7232, L7233 and L7234 (ANSP), art R7232-19.
See also arts L1271-1 to L1271-17 (‘Chèque emploi-service universel’).
51 Art L2261-15 provides that collective agreements can be extended. Arts L2261-15 to L2261-
31 set out the conditions and procedures by which collective agreements can be so extended. See
generally, M Freedland, ‘Employment Law’, in J Bell, S Boyron and S Whittaker, Principles of
French Law (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 494. See also ILO Conditions of Work Report (n 49) 27.
However note Freedland’s comment that despite the fact that the conceptual approach to collective
agreements remains intact, there is a great multiplicity of techniques of argument about the precise
effect and duration of collective agreements (at 495).
52 Convention collective nationale des salariés du particulier employeur du 24 novembre 1999.
In respect of other collective agreements for domestic workers, see Convention collective nationale
des salariés du particulier employeur du 24 novembre 1999. Etendue par arrêté du 2 mars 2000
(JO du 11 mars 2000); Convention collective nationale des assistants maternels du particulier
employeur du 1er juillet 2004. Etendue par arrêté du 17 décembre 2004 JORF 28 décembre 2004.
Convention collective nationale de travail concernant les jardiniers et jardiniers-gardiens de
propriétés privées du 30 janvier 1986. Etendue par arrêté du 27 mai 1986 JORF 8 juin 1986;
Convention collective nationale de la branche de l’aide, de l’accompagnement, des soins et des
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was signed in 1999, was ‘extended’ by an administrative decision53 and thus
applies to all domestic workers employed directly by a private individual who
‘perform some or all of the household’s domestic or familial tasks’.54 The
terms of the collective agreement are very detailed and cover all aspects of the
employment relationship including remuneration, dismissal and notice and trial
periods. They also address many aspects of the ‘specificity’ of domestic work,
including salary deductions for accommodation,55 night work (as well as
working time generally and holiday entitlements)56 and required standards
of accommodation.57 The provision of a written contract is required58 and
a model contract is attached to the collective agreement, which provides
guidance in respect of the terms of employment.59
These provisions mirror many of those in the Domestic Workers
Convention. French law recognizes domestic work as real work, constituting
‘one of the most detailed attempts to gear the employment contract specifically
to the domestic work relationship and enforce it in such a way as to prevent
abuse’.60 However, some of the elements of the regime contained in the
collective agreement, such as the right to professional training and develop-
ment61 for example, are difficult to implement.62 Monitoring compliance is
also problematic as French law requires a court order for the labour inspection
of a private home.63 In spite of these practical difficulties of implementation,
the French employment framework provides a model of regulation for other
jurisdictions and conforms to the normative approach followed in the ILO
Domestic Workers Convention as endorsed in General Comment of the UN
Committee on Migrant Workers and the General Recommendation of the
CEDAW Committee.
Recent developments in the French approach have been driven by a focus on
job creation in the sector,64 which has led to a number of innovations which
aim to recognize domestic workers and formalize the work sector.65 The most
prominent tool used to facilitate employment in the domestic work sector is the
services à domicile du 21 mai 2010/ Arrêté du 23 décembre 2011 portant extension de la
convention collective nationale de la branche de l’aide, de l’accompagnement, des soins et des
services à domicile et d’avenants à ladite convention collective (n° 2941).
53 Arrêté du 2 mars 2000 (JO du 11 mars 2000). 54 Art 1(a).
55 Art 5. 56 Art 6 and art 20(a)(5).
57 Art 21. 58 Art 7.
59 Model permanent contract, Annex 1 to the Collective Agreement of 1999, para 7.
60 ILO Report on Decent Work for Domestic Workers (Report IV(1)) (n 23) para 171.
61 Contained in art 25, together with the agreement contained at Annex V.
62 See F-X Devetter, F Jany-Catrice and T Ribault, Services à la personne (La Découverte
2009) in particular the chapter entitled ‘Des métiers sans profession’, 99.
63 See ILO Conditions of Work Report (n 49) 27.
64 See ‘Plan de dévelopement des services à la personne’ (16 February 2005) <http://travail-
emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/20050216_dp_presentation-plan.pdf> ; ‘Plan 2 de développement des
services à la personne: Créer, Professionaliser, Simplifier’ (ANSP, March 2009) <http://www.
servicesalapersonne.gouv.fr/Public/P/ANSP/Actus/2009/mars/20090324_Plan2.pdf> .
65 For a look at some of the innovations, see J-Y Kerbourc’h, ‘L’étonnant dynamisme de
l’emploi à domicile’ (2005) 2 Travail et Protection sociale, Alerte 29; M Borgetto, ‘Les services à
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‘service cheque’. In 2005, two pre-existing schemes were amalgamated and
replaced by the cheque emploi service universel (CESU).66 The CESU
déclaratif permits the consumer of domestic services to pay, declare and make
social security contributions for the domestic worker in a simplified manner
and householders can also claim an income tax reduction or credit on the
cheques.67 The initiative thus facilitates the formalization of domestic work
and domestic workers’ full participation in the formal economy.68 While the
scheme is not framed in terms of protecting domestic workers, this is a key step
in the reconstructive process of moving from a status relationship to a work
relationship—as emphasized by the ILO in promoting the ‘decent work’
paradigm for domestic workers.69
Specific barriers to formalizing the work relationship in the domestic setting
include employers’ reluctance to take on the administrative and financial duties
attaching to their role in the employment relationship. In recognizing and
seeking to address these issues, the CESU constitutes an acknowledgement
that the procedures governing formal employment are restrictive and expensive
for individual employers and may result in a failure to employ or employment
on an informal basis.70 French NGOs have, however, pointed to continuing
high levels of undeclared and informal work in private households, particularly
among migrant domestic workers (and linked to the irregular immigration
status of many of the migrants involved).71 A recent study of the impact of the
industrialization of paid domestic work in France concluded that despite the
innovations in French policy and regulation, ‘Improvements in working
conditions are not always evident . . . and recourse to an immigrant labour force
thus seems to be a solution.’72 Nonetheless, the CESU, together with the
collective convention, has contributed to making the domestic work sector
more visible and mainstream in French discourse.
la personne’ (2006) Revue de droit sanitaire et social 3; G Laforge, ‘La structuration de l’offre de
services à la personne après la loi du 26 juillet 2005’ (2006) Revue de droit sanitaire et social 5.
66 See PY Verkindt, ‘Le cheque emploi service universel’ Revue de droit sanitaire et social
(2006).
67 ANSP and Finances Publique, ‘Déclaration des revenus 2010’. For a full analysis of the
mechanism and implications of the CESU, see Verkindt, ‘Le cheque-emploi service universel’
(n 66). See also J Windebank, ‘The Chèque Emploi-Service, the Titre Emploi-Service and the
Chèque Emploi-Service Universel in France: The Commodification of Domestic Work as a Route
to Gender Equality?’ (2006) 14(2) Contemporary France 189; and Tomei (n 11).
68 Windebank (n 67). 69 Blackett (n 7) 11.
70 Windebank (n 67) 194.
71 EU Fundamental Rights Agency (n 12) 19. Although as the report points out, the levels are
difficult to quantify due to lack of data.
72 See also FX Devetter and S Rousseau, ‘The Impact of Industrialization on Paid Domestic
Work: The Case of France’ (2009) 15 European Journal of Industrial Relations 297, 311.
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2. Exemption and exclusion in UK law
The ‘specific regulation’ model adopted in France mirrors the approach of
some other European countries such as Sweden,73 the Netherlands74 and
Spain75, each of which have specific laws governing the employment of
domestic workers. Specific regulation contrasts with the model adopted in the
UK and Ireland, where domestic workers are covered by the provisions of
general employment law and there are no specific legal provisions or
instruments governing the regulation of domestic work as distinct from other
types of work. Unlike in France, the UK and Irish governments have shown no
appetite for expanding the domestic work sector as a means of job creation.
In the UK, domestic workers are covered under the provisions of general
employment law.76 However, there are a number of key exemptions from the
scope of labour protections in respect of domestic workers, reflecting a
historical tendency to exclude domestic workers from the scope of protective
employment legislation.77 Some modern employment legislation follows this
exclusionary model. This includes exemptions from health and safety law and
certain aspects of the regulation of working time.78 For those who are entitled
to the minimum wage, deductions may be made from that wage if domestic
workers receive accommodation,79 reflecting the strong worldwide trend in
favour of remunerating domestic workers in kind.80
Most notably, the requirement to pay the national minimum wage is not
applicable to domestic workers in situations where they live with their
employer and are treated as a member of the family, in accordance with
Regulation 2(2) of the National Minimum Wage Regulations. The protection
gaps arising from ‘integration into the family’ are demonstrated in the 2012
Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) decision in Julio v Jose.81 In these three
joined appeals from decisions of Employment Tribunals, the EAT found that
73 See C Calleman, ‘Domestic Services in a "Land of Equality": The Case of Sweden’ (2011)
23 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 121.
74 See S van Walsum, ‘Regulating Migrant Domestic Work in the Netherlands: Opportunities
and Pitfalls’ (2011) 23 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 141.
75 See M Léon, ‘Migration and Care Work in Spain: The Domestic Sector Revisited’ (2010)
9(3) Social Policy and Society 409. See also ‘Spain Approves New Regulations for Domestic
Employees’ (ILO, Developments in Law and Practice 2012).
76 See generally E Albin and V Mantouvalou, ‘The ILO Convention on Domestic Workers:
From the Shadows to the Light’ (2012) 41 Industrial Law Journal 67.
77 See S Hardy, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Great Britain (3rd edn, Kluwer Law
International 2007); also Albin and Mantouvalou ibid.
78 See section 51 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and Regulation 19, Working Time
Regulations 1998 (No 1833 of 1998) (which provides that Regulations 4(1) and (2), 6(1), (2) and
(7), 7(1), (2) and (6) and (8) do not apply in relation to a worker employed as a domestic servant in
a private household), respectively.
79 Regulations 36 and 37 of the Minimum Wage Regulations 1999.
80 ILO Report IV(1) (n 23) 7.
81 Appeal No UKEAT/0553/10/DM, Judgment of 8 December 2011 (EAT judgment). See also
M Lalani, ‘Ending the Abuse: Policies that Work to Protect Migrant Workers’ (Kalayaan May
2011) 22.
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none of the migrant domestic workers involved were entitled to the minimum
wage.82 The EAT found that Regulation 2(2) should be interpreted narrowly
and the worker’s place within the family considered holistically, with particular
regard to the provision of accommodation and meals and the sharing of tasks
(not including the work which the worker is employed to do) and leisure
activities.83 Other matters, such as the general dignity with which the domestic
worker is treated, the degree of privacy and autonomy they are afforded and the
extent to which, if at all, they are exploited may also be considered in
determining whether the worker is treated as part of the family.84 Applying this
test, the Tribunal found that Regulation 2(2) applied to each of the three
claimants involved, none of whom was entitled to the minimum wage for
the hours in which they were engaged in work.85 In the case of one of the
claimants, this conclusion that she was treated as part of the respondent’s
family was reached despite the finding that the respondent exploited the
claimant’s position to pay her less than she was entitled.86
3. Invisibility and innovation: The Irish approach
The Irish position diverges from both the French and the British approaches
and constitutes a middle ground between the two. The main body of Irish
employment legislation applies equally to workers employed in the private
home,87 and, unlike in the UK, domestic workers are not excluded from any
aspects of employment legislation.88 In fact, domestic work is striking in its
absence from specific mention in the legislative provisions. Thus while
domestic workers are treated as workers like any others, there is no attempt in
the Irish legislative framework to recognize the problems inherent in applying
both the content and spirit of employment protections within the private
home or the specificity of the issues arising in the context of the employment
relationship.
Although domestic workers are ‘invisible’ in Irish employment legislation,
more recent policy developments (prompted by pressure from trade unions and
migrant rights organizations)89 demonstrate a greater willingness to engage
with the commodification of domestic labour than has been shown to date in
the UK. The Code of Practice for Protecting Persons Employed in Other
82 EAT judgment, para 58. 83 ibid, para 46.
84 ibid, para 46. 85 ibid, para 58. 86 ibid, para 58.
87 Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation Richard Bruton has confirmed that: ‘domestic
workers are protected by virtue of the fact that the full suite of employment rights legislation,
including that of redress for violations of their employment rights, apply to domestic workers in the
same way as they apply to other categories of employees in Ireland’. Written Answers, Dáil Éireann
Debate Vol. 759 No 1 (13 March 2012) in response to a question from Gerald Nash TD.
88 Although the National Minimum Wage Act 2000 makes provision for deductions from the
workers’ wages for board and lodging: Section 20 of the Minimum Wage Act 2000.
89 The Code of Practice was developed on foot of a social partnership agreement (see footnote
infra) and the pilot inspection scheme was developed as a result of pressure from Migrant Rights
Centre of Ireland (see below).
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People’s Homes was drafted by the Labour Relations Commission in
collaboration with union and employer representatives in 2007.90 The Code
of Practice takes a two-pronged approach of reiterating the protections
available to domestic workers in general employment law and identifying
additional issues of particular concern. The employer must take reasonable
steps to ensure that the employee is aware of his or her statutory entitlements as
an employee.91 Some of the common problems faced by domestic workers are
also addressed, for example, the employer shall not withhold any personal
documentation belonging to the employee92 and, if the employee lives in the
home, the employer must provide a private secure room and a bed as well as
privacy of communication.93 The emphasis on the protection of the dignity and
autonomy of the employee is one of the most interesting features of the Code of
Practice and it is quite far-reaching in this respect.94 The ILO singled out these
provisions of the Code as an example of good practice.95 However, while the
Code of Practice contains a number of innovative provisions which are
protective of domestic workers and reflect ILO standards, unlike the French
Collective Agreement considered above, the Code is non-binding and does not
create any legally enforceable obligations, thus constituting a guide to best
practice rather than an enforceable part of the regulatory framework.96
The de facto exclusion of domestic workers from the enforcement of labour
regulations is a problem globally.97 The lack of monitoring of private homes as
workplaces was identified by the Migrant Rights Centre of Ireland (MRCI) as
one of the reasons for the continuing vulnerable position of domestic workers
(particularly migrant domestic workers) despite the application in principle of
labour protections to this group.98 In response to these criticisms, a pilot
90 It was agreed in section 23.2 of Part 2 of ‘Towards 2016 – Ten Year Framework Social
Partnership Agreement 2006–2015’ that the Labour Relations Commission should be asked to
develop a code of practice to set out the current employment rights and protections for persons
employed in other people’s homes pursuant to its functions under section 42 of the Industrial
Relations Act 1990. The Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice for Protecting Persons
Employed in Other Person’s Homes) (Declaration) Order 1990 declared that the code of practice
set out in the Schedule shall be a code of practice for the purposes of the Industrial Relations Act
1990. 91 Section 5.11.
92 For example, passport, visa, identity cards, bank account documentation. Section 5.8.
93 Section 5.2.2. 94 Section 5.10. See also section 5.2.1.
95 ILO (n 36) 48.
96 Although note that the Code does have some evidential value: section 42(4) of the Industrial
Relations Act 1990 provides that ‘In any proceedings before a court, the Labour Court, the
Commission, the Employment Appeals Tribunal, the Director of Equality Investigations or an
equality officer, a code of practice shall be admissible in evidence and any provision of the code
which appears to the court, body or officer concerned to be relevant to any question arising in the
proceedings shall be taken into account in determining that question.’ Section 43 provides that the
Labour Court can give its opinion on the interpretation on a code of practice, investigate a
complaint that there has been a breach of the code of practice and make a recommendation setting
out its view on the matter. 97 ILO Report (IV)(1) (n 23) 72.
98 See ‘MRCI Welcomes NERA Campaign to Protect Rights of Domestic Workers – 2010’
(Press Release, 16 November 2010). See also MRCI, ‘Private Homes: A Public Concern – The
Experiences of Twenty Migrant Women Employed in the Private Home in Ireland’
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scheme of labour inspections of private homes was carried out by the National
Employment Rights Agency (NERA) in 2011. NERA’s remit in conducting
these inspections is limited to that contained in the enabling legislation and the
primary mode of operation provided for in that legislation is the inspection of
written employment records99 as well as interviewing and obtaining infor-
mation from relevant people. The inspectors’ powers do not extend to the
inspection of health and safety standards or living conditions of live-in domestic
workers, for example,100 illustrating the limitations involved in not having any
legally binding provisions governing the specific situation of domestic workers.
Despite these limitations, in international terms this scheme is an innovative
one and few jurisdictions have engaged in developing such inspection
programmes.101 The experiences of the scheme thus provide important lessons
for regulatory regimes around Europe and beyond. NERA identified numerous
challenges in the design and implementation of the inspection programme, the
most significant of which was ‘finding’ domestic workers. Aside from cases in
which complaints are received, domestic employment situations are identified
primarily through an analysis of work permits and revenue records.102 This
highlights the importance of issues around the formalization of domestic work,
discussed in the French context above, in terms of the protection in practice of
the rights of domestic workers. In addition, the way in which domestic workers
are ‘found’ by means of state records means that the employers/employees
which can be identified are probably those with the most formalized
employment relationships and more likely to be compliant with employment
law generally.103 Consistent with this observation, while the level of non-
compliance with employment law was high, the NERA inspector noted that
non-compliance related to mainly small matters and he did not find any
evidence of serious abuse or exploitation.104 Although the inspections related
(Recommendation at para 3.4: ‘develop a special section in the Labour Inspectorate to investigate
this area of work’). See also the statistics contained in MRCI Domestic Workers Action Group
Survey, 2010 and Press Release, 1 May 2012. The domestic work sector holds the second largest
percentage of complaints made to MRCI.
99 NERA’s website lists the standard records to which an inspector will require access to
during the course of an inspection. List available at <http://www.employmentrights.ie/en/
informationforemployers/recordstobemadeavailableforinspections/> .
100 Some householders did show the inspector the accommodation provided to the domestic
worker, which in his view was satisfactory, however his official remit did not include inspecting the
accommodation provided.
101 S Mullally and C Kenny, ‘The ILO Convention and Recommendation on Decent Work for
Domestic Workers’ UCC Centre for Criminal Justice and Human Rights Working Paper (April
2012); M Galotti, ‘The Gender Dimension of Domestic Work in Western Europe’, No 96
International Migration Papers (International Labour Office, Geneva, 2009) 61. See also ILO
Conditions of Work Report (n 49).
102 See NERA Briefing of January 2011 and also updated undated briefing (copies on file with
the author). 103 As pointed out by NERA in its updated briefing.
104 Semi-structured interview with NERA officials, 19 April 2012, carried out by the author
(semi-structured interview). Updated briefing. The ‘inspections revealed the need for clarity
regarding the work an employee is required to perform and when they are required to perform it’.
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to a small sample of 19 households, this would appear to contradict the level of
abuse documented by the MRCI.105 The biggest challenge to the enforcement of
employment protections identified by inspectors in the course of the inspection
process was the issue of calculating working time for live-in domestic
workers,106 impacting the inspector’s ability to determine if the minimum
wage is being paid.107 This underlines some of the difficulties which can arise
when domestic workers become ‘integrated into the family’ making it difficult
to determine when they are working and tasks which they are expected to do.
One of the primary reasons why labour inspections are generally considered
to be problematic in the context of the domestic work sector is the legal
protection of the inviolability of the private home which is provided for in most
jurisdictions, meaning that inspectors cannot enter such premises without
permission.108 In Ireland, the inviolability of the private home is the only
specific legal limitation on the inspection of private homes compared to other
workplaces.109 However, in NERA’s view, this ‘in no way inhibited’ the
implementation of the pilot scheme, as 75 per cent of the employers consented
to the inspector inspecting the records in the home concerned and the
remainder arranged that the employment records be examined at an alternative
location. This finding provides an important counter-argument to that of
governments who maintain that inspection of private homes is legally and
practically unworkable.110
C. Divergence and Commonality in the Regulation of Domestic Work:
Prospects for Reform
The discussion above of the law in France, the UK and Ireland illustrates the
diversity of approaches to the regulation of domestic work, which was part of
105 MRCI Press Release, 30 April 2012: ‘In recent years MRCI has uncovered over forty cases
of forced labour and domestic servitude. We have also seen a marked increase in the exploitation of
domestic workers employed by embassies and diplomatic staff in Ireland.’
106 Semi-structured interview.
107 The method of calculating the employee’s average hourly rate of pay is set out in section 20
of the National Minimum Wage Act 2000.
108 EUFRA report (n 12) 38: ‘Labour inspectors usually play a secondary role, as their power to
carry out inspections in private homes is limited. They can generally intervene only after employees
report infractions. Court orders or similar permissions are usually required to conduct checks inside
private households.’ See also Galotti (n 101) 23. See also Smith, ‘Aging and Caring in the Home:
Regulating Paid Domesticity in the Twenty-First Century’ (n 24), in relation to health and safety
inspections. See also the EU position that the private home is not a normal workplace: Committee
on Domestic Workers 2011, para 631.
109 See Procedure 3.5, NERACase Management Manual (1 May 2011). This is noted by NERA
in its January 2011 briefing. The enabling legislation generally states: ‘An inspector shall not,
except with the consent of the occupier, enter a private dwelling (other than a part of the dwelling
used as a place of work) unless he or she has obtained a warrant from the District Court under
subsection (X) authorising the entry.’ See section 33 of the National MinimumWage Act 2000, for
example. 110 See ILO Report (IV)(1) (n 23).
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the reason that the negotiation of the Domestic Workers Convention was a
difficult process.111 The UK government’s refusal to support the Domestic
Workers Convention fits with its exclusionary model of exemptions and
exclusions from employment law for domestic workers. In France and Ireland,
attempts have been made to address specific aspects of the experience of
domestic workers, through specific legislative and ‘conventional’ protection
and targeted enforcement campaigns respectively. These provide examples of
practices which a legal order should be striving to follow in order to adequately
protect domestic workers’ employment-related rights, and they were among the
‘creative regulatory experimentations’ drawn on by the ILO in developing the
standards set out in the Convention.112 In addition, regulatory efforts in France
to formalize the domestic work sector go further than the requirements of the
Domestic Workers Convention and play an important role in constructing
domestic work as ‘real’ work.
Despite the existence of these elements of good practice in the regulatory
frameworks in France and Ireland, however, it cannot be said that a holistic or
fully effective approach to the protection of domestic workers has been taken
in either jurisdiction. None of the regimes examined meet the full range of
standards enshrined in the Domestic Workers Convention, particularly in
relation to the obligations to ensure effective access to justice (Article 16)
and provide effective and accessible compliance mechanisms (Article 17).
UK employment legislation contains serious gaps in coverage for domestic
workers. In France, effective enforcement remains a key issue, while Irish law
lacks binding provisions which take into account the characteristics of
domestic work. It is also noticeable that in spite of their attempts to deal with
the issues faced by domestic workers, neither the French Collective Agreement
nor the Irish Code of Practice contains specific provisions on migrant domestic
workers and these employment protections are not linked in any way to
migration law.
Overall, access to law for domestic workers suffering the everyday indignity
of sub-standard terms and conditions of work is limited in each of the
jurisdictions, in different ways. In this way, ‘(l)aw entrenches the prevailing
social values that . . . downplay reproductive work, even when commo-
dified’.113 The ILO has observed that decent work for domestic workers will
remain an ‘unrealised promise’ unless there is concerted action to improve the
legislative framework.114 A model regulatory framework in this sphere would
thus encompass legislative measures to ensure the extension of decent work
standards to domestic workers (using the Domestic Workers Convention
111 See generally, Albin and Mantouvalou (n 76) 67; see also Mullally and Kenny (n 101) 16 ff.
112 ILO Report (IV)(1) (n 23) 3.
113 G Mundlak and H Shamir, ‘Between Intimacy and Alienage: The Legal Construction of
Domestic and Carework in the Welfare State’ in H Lutz (ed) Migration and Domestic Work: A
European Perspective on a Global Theme (Ashgate 2008) 161, 166.
114 ILO Report (IV)(1) (n 23) 3.
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as guidance), together with the development of innovative, legislative and
administrative mechanisms aimed at increasing formalization and improving
effective enforcement. This would combat both the legal and practical
obstacles to rights protection faced by MDWs and constitute a significant
step towards ‘a transition from the paternalistic conception of the “good
employer” , acting out of a sense of noblesse oblige, to one that is founded on
respect for domestic workers’ labour rights’.115
III. RESTRICTING SECURE LEGAL MIGRATION PATHS FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES AND PROSPECTS
A. The Connection between Immigration Status and Rights for Migrant
Domestic Workers: Assessing International Standards
Despite the demand for domestic workers, few European countries issue work
permits for the purpose of domestic work.116 The Europe-wide trend in favour
of imposing restrictions on admission of migrants for female-dominated
occupations117 is a particular problem in the case of domestic workers, with
few legal avenues being opened to meet the growing demand for such
workers.118 As the next section will illustrate in the context of France, Ireland
and the UK, governments are refusing to acknowledge the need for migrant
domestic workers, which has resulted in a lack of secure migration routes for
this group of women.
The vulnerability of migrant domestic workers ‘throughout the migration
cycle’ is considered in detail in the UN Committee on Migrant Workers’ 2011
General Comment on migrant domestic workers. As well as highlighting the
impact of labour law, the general comment acknowledges that immigration law
can be a source of ‘specific vulnerabilities’ for migrant domestic workers, most
notably where immigration laws tie their status to the continued sponsorship
of specific employers.119 According to the Committee, sponsorship systems
reduce the liberty of movement of workers and increase the risk of exploitation,
including forced labour and servitude.120 In short, workers are unlikely to
pursue legal proceedings against the person on whom their immigration status
depends. Illustrating this, the ‘kafala’ system of sponsoring migrant domestic
workers practised in many of the Gulf States has been identified by the UNHuman
Rights Committee (amongst others) as a particular source of exploitation.121
115 ibid 13. 116 Galotti (n 101) 28.
117 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Migration, Refugees and
Population, Report on ‘Protecting Migrant Women in the Labour Market’ (Doc 12549, 24 March
2011).
118 EU Fundamental Rights Agency (n 12) Chap 1, ‘The Gap between Demand and Supply’.
119 CMW General Comment (n 13) para 21. 120 ibid.
121 Concluding Observations of the UN Human Rights Committee in Respect of Kuwait,
17 October 2011, para 18. See also Human Rights Watch, ‘Walls at Every Turn: Abuse of Migrant
Domestic Workers through Kuwait’s Sponsorship System’ (HRW 2010).
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In order to address the ‘specific vulnerabilities’ identified, the Committee
recommends that states ensure that migrant domestic workers have access to
regular channels for migration based on actual demand and avoid making
immigration status conditional on employment by a specific employer.122 In
addition, it states that family reunification should be facilitated for those with a
regular immigration status.123 These workers should also enjoy equal treatment
with nationals in relation to social and health services.124 Reflecting the real
difficulties in accessing justice and remedies for those with a temporary and/or
tied immigration status, states are encouraged to facilitate expedited proceed-
ings to address complaints by such migrant domestic workers.125 Finally,
special mechanisms which would facilitate access to redress are endorsed—for
example, the designation of a domestic workers’ Ombudsperson.126
The work of the CEDAW Committee, as well as the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, while not as detailed, supports the
approach of the Committee on Migrant Workers. The CEDAW Committee in
its 2008 General Recommendation on women migrant workers clarified
that it views the exclusion of certain female-dominated occupations from
visa schemes as indirect discrimination against women.127 In 2010, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a resolution urging
member states to ‘develop independent visa schemes for migrant domestic
workers and care workers which would allow legal entry, provide a
standardized working contract, allow for a change of employer . . . and ensure
that visas are not tied to particular employers’.128 Together, the standards
recommended by these international and regional bodies provide the contours
of an appropriate immigration regime for migrant domestic workers.
B. National Approaches to the Regulation of Immigration for
Domestic Workers
1. Absence of long-term legal channels of immigration in France and Ireland
Work permits for migrant domestic workers are, in principle, part of the
general work permit system in Ireland and in France; however, through specific
restrictions in place, migrant domestic workers are excluded from obtaining an
ordinary work permit. In Ireland, migrant domestic workers would be required
to obtain a work permit under the Employment Permits Act 2003 (as amended)
and the surrounding administrative framework. Under the relevant
122 CMW General Comment (n 13) paras 51–53.
123 CMW General Comment (n 13) paras 54–55.
124 CMW General Comment (n 13) para 42.
125 CMW General Comment (n 13) para 50. 126 ibid.
127 CEDAW General Recommendation (n 17) para 11.
128 Protecting Migrant Women in the Labour Market. Report of the Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Population. Ms Pernille Frahm. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc11/EDOC12549.pdf).
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administrative scheme, however, a limited number of job categories are
deemed ineligible for such permits. Prior to 2009, the job category of
‘domestic work’ was ineligible for a work permit but many domestic workers
entered the country on the basis of a work permit issued for the purposes of
working as a childminder, mother’s aid, care worker, or nanny.129 MRCI’s
research showed that this often formed the basis for a false job description and
ill-defined employment relationship which could in turn lead to exploitation.130
The Irish government’s response to the problems associated with this migration
route was to close it, and since April 2009, all domestic workers, including
carers in the home and childminders and nannies, have been included on the
list of ineligible job categories and are thus excluded from obtaining a work
permit.131
This inaccessibility of legal channels of migration to migrant domestic
workers is reflected in French law, despite the approach followed there, as
described above, of treating domestic work as a distinct work sector with
its own forms of regulation. Work permits for domestic workers in France
fall under the general work permit regime, which works on the basis of
occupational lists which define the categories of occupation for which work
permits are available. A number of categories of domestic work feature on
the occupational list for migrants from Romania and Bulgaria,132 including
household workers,133 home carers134, child carers,135 and nurse’s aides.136
However, domestic work is not included on the occupational list for non-EEA
nationals.137 In addition, bilateral migration agreements between France and
African countries generally do not provide for migration for domestic work.138
Notwithstanding the inaccessibility of mainstream migration routes in France,
temporary work permits are available to allow foreign domestic workers to
accompany their overseas employers to France for short periods of three
months at a time. Foreign domestic workers may obtain temporary work
permits under Article L1262-1 of the Labour Code, which allows for
employers to apply for the ‘secondment’ or temporary assignment of their
workers in France.139 A work permit for one year may be issued, but it is not
129 MRCI, ‘Private Homes, A Public Concern: The Experience of Twenty Migrant Women
Employed in the Private Home in Ireland’, 21.
130 ibid 21. 131 Ibid Appendix A.
132 Arrêté du 18 janvier 2008 relatif à la délivrance, sans opposition de la situation de l’emploi,
des authorisations de travail aux ressortissants de Etats de l’Union européene soumis a des
dispostions transitoires. 133 ‘Employé de ménage à domicile’.
134 ‘Intervenant à domicile’.
135 ‘Intervenant aupres des enfants’. 136 ‘Aide-soignant’.
137 Arrêté du 18 janvier 2008 relatif à la délivrance, sans opposition de la situation de l’emploi,
des authorisations de travail aux étrangers non ressortissants d’un Etat membre de l’Union
européenne, d’un autre Etat partie à l’Espace économique européen ou de la Confédération
Suisse. 138 EUFRA (n 12).
139 Art L1262-1-3 of the Labour Code and Circular NOR IMIM0900078C of 3 August 2009.
The Circular introduces a simplified procedure for applying for the work permit, involving the
filing of a form with the relevant authorities.
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valid for stays of over three months in a six-month period. While in France,
these workers are covered by French employment law including minimum
wage legislation,140 and employers are required to pay social security
contributions for the workers.141 However, these arrangements are very
temporary in nature and do not give this category of migrant domestic workers
a status independent of their employer. They are not permitted to change
employer once in France, meaning that they are ‘tied’ to their employer for
their work permit. Despite the fact that these workers are, in principle,
protected by French employment law,142 their legal immigration status thus
places them in a precarious position of dependency in respect of their
employer. This is quite similar to the visa regime for domestic workers
introduced in the UK in 2012, as discussed below.143
2. UK immigration ‘reform’ and the overseas domestic worker visa
On the same day that it abstained from the vote on the Domestic Workers
Convention, the UK Government announced a consultation which would result
in sweeping changes to the Overseas Domestic Worker (ODW) visa regime.144
These changes rolled back immigration law reforms achieved through years of
political mobilization by migrant domestic workers. From 1998 until 2012,
following a long campaign by the Waling-Waling and Kalayaan migrant
domestic workers’ associations,145 the UK Immigration Rules146 provided for
a specific status for migrant domestic workers working in private households
by way of the ODW visa. The ODW visa was granted for a period of up to
12 months,147 which could be extended for 12 months at a time.148 Crucially,
under the terms of the visa, domestic workers were permitted to change
employer as long as they remained in the domestic work sector. Family
reunification was provided for as dependents could apply to go with the
migrant domestic worker to the UK or to join them there.149 Migrant domestic
workers also had a pathway to long-term residence and citizenship—providing
a possible route out of temporary immigration status for migrant domestic
workers.150 Despite difficulties with some aspects of the status afforded by
140 Art L1262-1-4 of the Labour Code.
141 Circular NOR IMIM0900078C of 3 August 2009, referring to the provisions of Article
R312-4 of the Social Security Code.
142 Circular NOR IMIM0900078C of 3 August 2009. 143 Lalani (n 81).
144 UK Border Agency, ‘Employment-Related Settlement, Tier-5 and Overseas Domestic
Workers: A Consultation’ (June 2011) (Consultation Paper).
145 See generally B Anderson, ‘Mobilizing Migrants, Making Citizens: Migrant Domestic
Workers as Political Agents’ (2010) 33(1) Ethnic and Racial Studies 60.
146 The Immigration Rules 1994 HC 395 (as amended) (Immigration Rules).
147 Formerly para 159B of the Immigration Rules.
148 Formerly para 159E of the Immigration Rules.
149 This was not set out in the Immigration Rules but was accepted practice.
150 As they could qualify for ‘indefinite leave to remain’ if they met the criteria laid down in
Immigration Rule 159G.
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the visa, including narrow eligibility conditions151 and practical difficulties
associated with trying to find alternative similar employment in the event of
leaving the employer,152 the regulatory framework of the ODW visa provided a
relatively secure legal status which implied respect for family unity and
included the potential for long-term settlement. This is broadly in line with the
recommendations on appropriate immigration law regimes for migrant
domestic workers made by the UN Committee on Migrant Workers.
Research conducted by the migrant domestic workers’ NGO Kalayaan
showed that the option to change employer provided for by the ODW visa
played a vital role in enabling migrant domestic workers to escape from
abusive employers, in empowering them to negotiate fairer terms and
conditions and in facilitating the pursuit of legal remedies against their
employers.153 In the views of a House of Commons Select Committee on
Human Trafficking in the UK convened in 2009154 and the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants,155 the ODW visa also
helped to reduce the incidence of trafficking and forced labour among migrant
domestic workers. This direct linkage of the ODW visa to preventing forced
labour and trafficking is especially important in the context of the European
Court of Human Rights’ recognition of the links between immigration status
and vulnerability to exploitation in its judgment in Rantsev v Cyprus and
Russia.156 The evolving ECHR jurisprudence on the extent of states’ positive
obligations of protection in respect of the prohibition on slavery, servitude and
forced labour in Article 4 ECHR is considered further in the next section.
In spite of the recommendations of the House of Commons Select
Committee and the UN Special Rapporteur, in February 2012, it was
announced that the Immigration Rules would be amended to provide that
ODWs in private households will only be permitted to accompany and work
for visitors.157 They must leave the UK with the visitor, or after a maximum of
six months.158 They may not extend their stay, switch employer, sponsor
dependants or gain long-term residence (‘settle’) in the UK.159 The terms of the
revised ODW visa thus resemble closely those of the temporary ‘secondment’
work permit available in France.
151 Formerly para 159A of the Immigration Rules.
152 See Lalani (n 81). 153 Lalani (n 81) 18–21.
154 House of Commons, Home Affairs Select Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2008–2009,
The Trade in Human Beings: Human Trafficking in the UK, HC 23-I, 14 May 2009, paras 118–119.
155 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of
migrants, Addendum: Mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
16 March 2010, A/HRC/14/30/Add.3, p. 15 and 16, and recommendation at para 76.
156 Application No 25965/04, Judgment of 7 January 2010.
157 Home Office Announcement, ‘Immigration (Employment-related settlement, Overseas
Domestic Workers, Tier 5 of the Points Based System and Visitors)’, 29 February 2012.
158 Paras 159A(iv) and 159B of the Immigration Rules.
159 Paras 159A(vi), 159G(i) and 159E of the Immigration Rules.
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Under the temporary work permits available to migrant domestic workers in
both the UK and France, such workers benefit from the normal range of
employment protections. However, in practice, the time limit imposed on the
visa combined with the restriction on changing employer prevents the worker
from enforcing these rights. In the case of the UK, Kalayaan points out that
these factors effectively prevent the worker from seeking justice through the
employment tribunal system; they would have no right to stay in the UK for the
tribunal case and would be unable to work to support themselves or their
families whilst they wait for the case to come to tribunal.160 There is no
provision for granting residence permits to such individuals who are seeking
redress through the employment law system in the UK or France. The
entitlement to residence permits and protection from expulsion during labour
procedures (as opposed to criminal prosecutions for trafficking or forced labour
offences) has been identified by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency as
a crucial element in ensuring effective remedies for migrant domestic
workers.161 In the absence of such measures, the protection afforded by the
employment frameworks discussed in the first section is largely illusory.
The changes to the UK Immigration Rules came into effect on 6 April
2012.162 The primary justification offered for the move towards a more
precarious, temporary status was the perceived skill level attached to domestic
work. Migrant domestic workers were considered by the Government to
generally be doing low-skilled work, and allowing such unrestricted low-
skilled entry for an extended period was seen as running counter to the
Government’s wider policy of restricting numbers of low-skilled workers.163
The perception of domestic work as an atypical, ‘low-skilled’164 form of work,
to be performed by someone who becomes a surrogate ‘member of the family’
rather than a worker with full employment (and immigration status) is evident
in the discourse in the UK surrounding both the Domestic Workers Convention
and the ‘reform’ of the ODW visa.165 In immigration law terms, these factors
have resulted in domestic workers being framed as undesirable migrants.
Overall, current UK law and policy reveals a retreat from a framework
premised on a rights-based paradigm of domestic work.
160 Kalayaan, ‘Response to “Employment-Related Settlement, Tier-5 and Overseas Domestic
Workers: A Consultation”’ (5 August 2011).
161 EUFRA Report (n 12) 39.
162 Home Office Announcement, ‘Immigration (Employment-related settlement, Overseas
Domestic Workers, Tier 5 of the Points Based System and Visitors)’, 29 February 2012, 2; Lord
Reay, House of Lords 28 November 1990 c1052.
163 Consultation Paper, 29. See also National Institute of Social and Economic Research
(commissioned by the Migration Advisory Committee, ‘Skilled Immigration and Strategically
Important Skills in the UK economy’ (17 January 2012 <http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/
sitecontent/documents/aboutus/workingwithus/mac/research-skill/niesr-skilled.pdf?view=Binary>).
164 Consultation Paper, 29.
165 In relation to the ILO Convention, see eg HL Deb Col WA242 (Baroness Wilcox)
(12 October 2011); HC Deb cols 288–289 (Ed Davey MP) (29 June 2011). In relation to the ODW
visa, see eg Consultation Paper, ibid; Home Office Announcement (n 162).
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C. Converging Exclusionary Immigration Regimes and Exploring
Alternative Models
Part I of this article outlined the employment protections that apply (or not) to
domestic workers. Part II has illustrated that each of the jurisdictions examined
show a marked tendency towards limiting access to secure migration channels
for domestic workers coming from outside the EU, a shift which has been
particularly controversial in the UK. The general lack of explicit recognition in
immigration policies of the need for migrants to carry out domestic work166
does not stop this work being carried out, and these workers ‘endure the
difficult conditions of life in a twilight zone’.167 Domestic workers enter
Europe with a wide range of immigration statuses outside the regular work
permit system,168 including admission via temporary work permits, au pair
programmes, spousal or dependent residence permits and as sponsored
employees of diplomats.169 Some European states, such as Italy, have
established annual quotas for women migrant domestic workers,170 and
regularization schemes for irregular migrant domestic workers have been
implemented in Italy, Greece and Spain.171 Most of the immigration statuses
conferred under these various schemes are precarious in the sense of being of a
limited duration and/or dependent in some way on the legal status of another
person.
These trends are evident in the temporary immigration statuses available to
migrant domestic workers in the UK and France discussed above—which are
time-limited and not open to renewal, and do not provide for family
reunification or a path to settlement. It was seen that the conditions attached
to these visas effectively restrict access to legal protections contained in the
employment regime. Ultimately, as the work is not ascribed any economic
value, no incentive is provided to attract migrant domestic workers and the
resulting immigration statuses do not attempt to give these women a secure
166 ‘Rights of Migrant Domestic Workers in Europe’ (UN Human Rights, Office of the High
Commissioner Europe Regional Office 2010) at 10.
167 H Lutz, ‘When Home Becomes a Workplace: Domestic Work as an Ordinary Job in
Germany?’ in H Lutz (ed) Migration and Domestic Work: A European Perspective on a Global
Theme (Ashgate 2008) 43, 49. 168 Galotti (n 101).
169 ibid. See also Danish Centre against Human Trafficking, ‘Au pair and
trafficked? –Recruitment, residence in Denmark and dreams for the future, A qualitative study of
the prevalence and risk of human trafficking in the situations and experiences of a group of au pairs
in Denmark’ (2010); Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating
Trafficking in Human Beings, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, ‘Unprotected
Work, Invisible Exploitation: Trafficking for the Purpose of Domestic Servitude’, (OSCE 2010).
See also A Kartusch, ‘Domestic Workers in Diplomats’ Households: Rights Violations and Access
to Justice in the Context of Diplomatic Immunity’ (German Human Rights Institute 2011).
170 F van Hooren, ‘When Families Need Immigrants: The Exceptional Position of Migrant
Domestic Workers and Care Assistants in Italian Immigration Policy’ 2(2) Bulletin of Italian
Politics (2010) <http://gla.ac.uk/media/media_194307_en.pdf> 21–38.
171 See generally León (n 75); F Scrinzi, ‘Migrations and the Restructuring of the Welfare State
in Italy: Change and Continuity in the Domestic Work Sector’ in H Lutz (ed) Migration and
Domestic Work: A European Perspective on a Global Theme (Ashgate 2008) 29.
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place in society or a real voice—a position which is anathema to the ‘decent
work’ paradigm advocated by the ILO. The causative connection between the
lack of legal immigration channels for domestic workers and the high degree of
irregularity in the sector has been identified by the EU Fundamental Rights
Agency, among others.172 The Irish approach, which is to block this route
for legal migration altogether, potentially diverts all new migrant domestic
workers into irregularity and even greater susceptibility to exploitation.173
An alternative approach, which would acknowledge the demand for migrant
domestic workers as well as the vital care functions which these workers
perform, would be to adopt immigration regulations in line with the normative
model set out by the Committee on Migrant Workers and the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe. This model was shown to work to protect
migrant domestic workers in the UK in the period between 1998 and 2012.
Independent visa schemes for domestic workers, which would allow them to
change employer, enjoy family unity and gain access to social protection
would conform to this paradigm. In the key area of the enforcement of labour
protections, a secure and independent status would also facilitate access to law
and remedies, enabling such workers to negotiate fair terms and conditions and
deterring employment law violations. From a human rights perspective, this
constitutes an appropriate way forward for immigration regulation in this
sphere. As recent ‘reforms’ in the UK show, however, governments are ever
more reluctant to recognize the connections between immigration status,
vulnerability and exploitation. In Europe, the current trend is in the opposite
direction to the model immigration regime identified by international human
rights bodies and there is little sign of governments changing their approach to
this issue.
IV. FORCED LABOUR DIMENSIONS OF MIGRANT DOMESTIC WORK: THE POTENTIAL
AND THE LIMITATIONS OF RECENT ECHR JURISPRUDENCE
A. Developing Positive Obligations under Article 4: The Migrant Domestic
Workers Cases
This article has revealed a resistance on the part of states to providing safe
channels of migration and effective access to law and legal remedies for
migrant domestic workers. A series of cases taken by migrant domestic
workers under the ECHR have highlighted the tensions between this resistance
and states’ human rights obligations in the context of the Article 4 ECHR
prohibition on slavery, servitude and forced labour. In its seminal judgment in
172 EU Fundamental Rights Agency (n 12); CMW General Comment (n 13) para 21.
173 See CMW General Comment (n 13) para 21: ‘Overly restrictive immigration laws may lead
to higher numbers of migration domestic workers who are undocumented or in an irregular
situation, and thus particularly vulnerable to human rights violations’.
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Siliadin v France,174 in which the applicant was a Togolese migrant domestic
worker, the Court held that France had breached Article 4 in not having
criminal law provisions that would allow for the penalization and effective
prosecution of the act of keeping someone in a situation of forced labour. The
Court noted that criminal sanctions are the only effective deterrent in these
situations175 and found that the relevant French criminal provisions in place
were not specific enough and were too restrictive to provide effective
protection. In C.N. and V v France176 and C.N. v United Kingdom,177 the
Court built on the positive obligations findings in Siliadin and reiterated the
procedural obligation of states to effectively investigate complaints which raise
‘a credible suspicion that the person has been held in domestic servitude’.178 In
C.N. v France, the ILO definition of forced labour as ‘work performed under
the menace of some penalty, and for which the person has not offered
themselves voluntarily’, was confirmed.179 The Court also established in that
case that the notion of a ‘penalty’ could include psychological threats such as
reporting an illegal immigrant to the police or the immigration authorities.180
As the Court noted in C.N. v UK, the Article 4 cases illustrate the
‘increasingly high standard’ required of states in respect of the protection of
human rights and fundamental liberties, and the consequent ‘firmness’ of the
Court in ‘assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic
societies’.181 One question which remains unresolved in the case law,
however, is whether the developing ‘positive obligations’ of states to prevent
treatment contrary to Article 4 extend to ensuring effective access to
employment protections by (among other things) providing secure channels
of migration for domestic workers. In Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia,182 the
Court established that trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation came
within the scope of the Article 4 prohibition. Here, the Court expressly linked
states’ obligations to prevent trafficking to the migration regime, in finding,
among other things, that the ‘cabaret artiste’ visa regime in place in Cyprus was
known to facilitate trafficking. The State’s positive obligations had been
breached in retaining this immigration route. However, less direct links
between migration law and trafficking or forced labour than existed in Rantsev
(where the Cypriot government was shown to have known of the consequences
of the cabaret artiste visa even when they introduced other anti-trafficking
measures) are not as straightforward for the Strasbourg Court to recognize.
In Siliadin, the applicant had entered France on a tourist visa whereupon her
174 (2006) 43 EHRR 16. 175 ibid paras 143–145.
176 Application No 67724/09, Judgment of 11 October 2012.
177 Application No 4239/08, Judgment of 13 November 2012.
178 C.N. v UK, Application No 4239/08, Judgment of 13 November 2012, para 71.
179 C.N. and V v France, Application No 67724/09, Judgment of 11 October 2012, para 71.
180 ibid para 77.
181 C.N. v UK, Application No 4239/08, Judgment of 13 November 2012, para 75.
182 Application No 25965/04, Judgment of 7 January 2010.
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papers were confiscated and she was told by her employers that her situation
would be regularized—which never happened. The Court did not link the
issues of immigration status, vulnerability and protection from treatment
contrary to Article 4 in its judgment. In C.N. v France, the links were more
explicit and the Court found that the threat of deportation could be a factor in
determining whether a work situation constitutes forced labour. However, it has
stopped short of linking the treatment of migrant domestic workers in a manner
contrary to Article 4 to the immigration policies of states on domestic workers.
Even where it is shown that a particular immigration regime puts a migrant
domestic worker at risk of treatment contrary to Article 4, it is open to States to
‘remedy’ the situation by closing or limiting migration routes. This approach
was followed in respect of the recent changes to the ODW visa in the UK.183
During the course of the debate on the reform of the ODW visa, the UK
Government made it clear that it rejected the idea that providing migrant
domestic workers with a secure status was the appropriate way to address the
problem of the abuse and exploitation of such workers. The blame for this
exploitation was laid solely at the hands of abusive employers, rather than
acknowledging the role of restrictive employment and migration laws in
creating the conditions where such abuse is possible.184 According to the UK
Government, the most effective approach is to limit the importation of abusive
employment relationships by restricting this route of migration as much as
possible.185
B. Assessing the Impact of Article 4 ECHR on Remedying the Exploitation
of Migrant Domestic Workers
States have responded to Siliadin by amending and introducing criminal
legislation to deal with offences arising from conditions of slavery, servitude
and forced labour. In France, Articles 225-13, 225-14 and 225-15186 of the
Criminal Code were amended prior to the delivery of the judgment.187 In the
UK, section 71 of the Coroner’s Act 2009, providing for the offences of
183 S Mullally and C Murphy, ‘Decent Work for Domestic Workers: Recognising the Migration
Nexus’ (paper presented at Seminar on Gender, Migration and Human Rights, EUI Florence,
18–20 June 2012) (copy on file with the author).
184 HC Deb col 101WH (10 May 2006).
185 See UK Border Agency, ‘Employment-Related Settlement, Tier-5 and Overseas Domestic
Workers: A Consultation’ (June 2011) 30.
186 Article 34, Loi no 2003-239 du 18 mars 2003 pour la sécurité intérieure (NOR:
INTX0200145L).
187 While the Court ‘noted’ that the legislation had been amended, it did not opine on whether
the amended legislation provided practical and effective protection against the actions of which the
applicant was a victim, as it was not in force at the time and therefore did not apply (para 148). The
amendments were quite minimal and the relevant provisions still ‘do not deal specifically with the
rights guaranteed under Article 4 of the Convention, but concern, in a much more restrictive way,
exploitation through labour and subjection to working and living conditions that are incompatible
with human dignity’ (para 142) meaning that French law is probably still in breach of art 4.
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holding a person in slavery, servitude or forced labour, was introduced.188
Ireland is almost certainly in breach of its obligations under Article 4 in failing
to provide for a criminal law prohibition on forced labour or other effective
protection through criminal law.189 In April 2013, the Irish government
introduced the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Bill 2013,
which aims to (among other things) remedy this defect.190 The case law of the
European Court of Human Rights, in emphasizing states’ legal obligations of
effective protection and insisting on a minimum standard which states must
meet in respect of deterring treatment in breach of Article 4, has thus played a
crucial role in requiring states to acknowledge and address modern forms of
involuntary labour.
All of this raises the broader question of the response of states to forms of
exploitation not reaching the threshold of severity of ‘forced labour’, which are
primarily addressed through the employment law framework. Measures
providing for forced labour offences are, in themselves, insufficient to address
the broad spectrum of employment exploitation suffered by migrant domestic
workers, from underpayment of wages to inadequate rest periods and sub-
standard live-in accommodation.191 As Mantouvalou and Albin point out,
‘state intervention in very extreme situations of ‘modern slavery’ is not
sufficient for domestic workers’ protection’.192 As was noted earlier, none of
the employment frameworks in France, the UK or Ireland is sufficiently
developed to effectively deal with these ‘lesser’ forms of exploitation of
domestic workers and this constitutes a source of vulnerability for domestic
workers, particularly where the workers are migrants holding a precarious
immigration status, or have no legal immigration status. As shown in the
position taken by the UK government in the debates on the ODW visa,
however, states do not accept that their ‘positive obligations’ of protection
extend to ensuring effective access to employment protections by (among other
things) providing secure channels of migration for domestic workers. This
illustrates the limited impact of forced labour prohibitions for migrant domestic
workers in the broader context of severely limited access to law and legal
remedies.
188 V Mantouvalou, ‘Modern Slavery: The UK Response’ (2010) 39 Industrial Law Journal
425.
189 See C Murphy, ‘State Needs to Work on Slavery’ (Irish Times, 5 January 2013).
190 Section 1 of the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) (Amendment) Bill 2013 proposes to
amend the definition of “labour exploitation” contained in the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking)
Act 2008 to encompass the ILO definition of forced labour.
191 Albin and Mantouvalou (n 76) 67. See also Mantouvalou (n 188) and V Mantouvalou,
‘Servitude and Forced Labour in the 21st Century: The Human Rights of Domestic Workers’
(2006) 35 Industrial Law Journal 395.
192 Albin and Mantouvalou (n 76) 67. See also Mantouvalou (n 188) and Mantouvalou (n 191)
395.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Lutz and Pallenga-Mollenbeck have argued that the intersection of gender,
social care and migration regimes is at the heart of the phenomenon of
domestic work in Europe.193 This article has explored the slightly different
question of the intersection of employment law and migration law. It has put
forward the idea that the ‘transformative’ potential of labour law for migrant
domestic workers,194 as evident in the innovative provisions of the Domestic
Workers Convention for example, is often undermined by restrictions imposed
by immigration law. National employment law and immigration law need to
‘speak to’ one another in a way which allows migrant domestic workers to
effectively access legal remedies. Debates on an empowerment strategy for
domestic workers which centre on standard setting in employment law must
thus also take into account the impact of immigration law in the case of migrant
domestic workers.195
Despite the considerable divergence in approach to the regulation of
domestic work in France, the UK and Ireland, it has been shown that migrant
domestic workers suffer from a lack of access to employment law protections in
all three jurisdictions—albeit in different ways. Moreover, in each of the three
countries considered, both the ‘mismatch between the realities of the job
market and employment migration policies and legislation’196 and the
unwillingness of governments to acknowledge the potential of immigration
law to undermine rights protection mechanisms are also clear. In common with
most European countries, each of these states is reluctant to recognize human
rights implications of or limits to immigration law and policies and visa
regimes. At present, the precarious position of migrant domestic workers in
both employment and in immigration law means that protection from the
continuum of exploitation suffered by this group continues to be more
‘theoretical and illusory’ than ‘practical and effective’197 in Europe.
In identifying significant rights-protection gaps for migrant domestic
workers at the national level and considering the causes of these gaps, this
paper has also presented examples of good practice and considered potential
options for ameliorating the situation. It was shown that, in the present context
of limited access to law and to remedies, the impact of forced labour
prohibitions is severely curtailed for migrant domestic workers. Thus, while
the European Court of Human Rights has achieved much in requiring states to
ensure the effective criminalization of contemporary forms of slavery,
individual litigation before the Court is not a substitute for the codification of
193 H Lutz and E Palenga-Mollenbeck, ‘Care, Gender and Migration: Towards a Theory of
Transnational Domestic Work Migration in Europe’ (2011) 19(3) Contemporary European Studies
349. 194 Blackett (n 7) 6.
195 ibid 6. See also D’Souza (n 11).
196 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (n 5) 19.
197 Airey v Ireland [1979] 2 EHRR 305, para 24.
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protective employment and immigration rules. Engagement by governments
with international standards relating to employment and immigration provides
the best prospect of true reform for this category of worker. The standards set
by the ILO and the UN Committee on Migrant Workers provide a good model
of regulation for national employment regimes and immigration regimes,
respectively. The ILO standards, in particular, draw on and build upon existing
creative regulatory practices such as those developed in France and Ireland.
These practices show that states are willing, at least in the sphere of
employment law, to try to extend the reach of regulatory protections to
domestic workers. While states may continue to be reluctant to be formally
bound by the Domestic Workers Convention and the UN Convention on
Migrant Workers, much could be achieved through the use of these
international standards to guide regulatory development at the national level.
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